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On Nov. 15, 2007, Professor Andrew F. Popper testified before the House Committee on
the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law. The hearing topic,
Protecting the Playroom: Holding Foreign Manufacturers Accountable for Defective Prod-
ucts, involved the continuing product liability problems associated with the sale of defective
goods produced by foreign manufacturers. Professor Popper’s written testimony, including
a legislative update, is reprinted below, followed by a post-hearing addendum.
The following is the full written testimony, as edited after the hearing. Edits were made
to clarify and update various arguments presented during the course of the hearing.
Unavailable and Unaccountable:
A Free Ride for Foreign Manufacturers of Defective Consumer Goods
BY PROFESSOR ANDREW F. POPPER I. Defective Goods From China: Who Is to
Blame?
I t has been my honor over the last 25 years to testifyon legislation pertaining to the tort system. Mostproposed legislation I have addressed was designed
to limit or abolish the rights of those injured by defec-
tive products. How extraordinary then to be in a hear-
ing, speaking in favor of the imposition of liability for
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those who have caused harm, and find this is a position,
magically, supported by both mainstream political par-
ties and U.S. manufacturers.
The basic question posed is not complicated: of
course foreign manufacturers should be accountable
for goods they produce that cause harm. The formula is
simple: when consumers rely reasonably on assurances
of product quality, when consumers are in a position
where testing products is not only unlikely but by-and-
large impossible, one would think the imposition of tort
liability is a foregone conclusion. This is and should be
true for both domestic and foreign manufacturers.
When a product line fails and millions of people, in
this instance mostly children, are placed at risk, hear-
ings like this are conducted to understand the reason
this has occurred. In Freudian shorthand, we look for
someone to blame. After the massive, deadly fires in
Southern California in October 2007, the hunt was on to
find a culprit. Notwithstanding the fact that the wooded
hills of Southern California were dangerously dry and
made ready for conflagration by the Santa Ana winds,
many took comfort with the discovery of a 10-year-old
child who had, allegedly, been playing with matches.
With due and genuine deference to the successful inves-
tigators in the San Diego hills, and to those who cor-
nered Mrs. O’Leary and her cow after blocks of bone-
dry wooden buildings went up in flames in the Great
Chicago Fire, sometimes finding a singular wrongdoer
is not really the solution. Sometimes the immediate
mode of incitement is not the central problem.
Non-U.S. manufacturers imported into the United
States children’s toys containing toxic levels of lead.
Shortly thereafter, a discovery was made that certain
play-beads designed for children contain dangerous
and potentially deadly drugs. CD players were found
that burst into flames, transparent yo-yo strings were
sold that produced a risk of constriction, and cribs
made in China were discovered to have design flaws
that created the horrifying prospect of infant strangula-
tion. This is not a problem solved by identifying one
producer of toy cars in China who, supposedly follow-
ing a U.S. distributor’s design specifications, increased
lead levels in paint.
This is a system-wide problem.
This is the effluent of tort reform.
Tort reform was designed to limit or in some in-
stances abolish liability in the civil justice system, as-
suming a sufficiently gullible state legislature or con-
gressional committee could be found. Year after year,
the tort reformers came to the Capitol and to the state
houses, demanding relief from the accountability our
law had required. They begged legislators to abolish
strict liability, relieve component part manufacturers of
liability, cap non-economic losses, create arbitrary
time-frames in which injured persons could file claims,
ratchet up standards of proof for scientific evidence,
abolish joint and several liability, abolish or grossly
limit punitive damages, and neuter the Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Commission. With singular determination,
they sought to dismantle a system that generated a
tough, market-based force that compelled the produc-
tion of safer and more efficient products and services.
State legislatures and occasional congressional com-
mittees gave in to these requests, congratulating them-
selves that they were leveling the playing field and in-
terjecting sanity into a system gone mad. The press
(particularly The Washington Post), apparently deliri-
ous at the prospect of being free of punitive damages
when they defame someone into reputational oblivion,
joined the hunt, backing these initiatives.
In the feeding frenzy that resulted, there were casual-
ties. All of the ‘‘reforms’’ mentioned above, in one form
or another, have been adopted in different states, and
some even made federal law. In so doing, the vital mar-
ket pressure, the corrective justice force, the incentive
value of a strong, well-developed civil liability system,
sadly, was diluted or lost.1
If you are looking for a culprit, your search has
ended. It is tort reform. Stripped of many of the strong
civil justice incentives to make products at the state of
the art and free from coherent regulatory oversight and
enforcement, foreign manufacturers and their domestic
distributors failed to exercise due care. They went with
products that were inexpensive, untested, popular,
profitable, and deadly. With limited or no punitive dam-
ages, with no joint and several liability, with future liti-
gation risk minimized, what else would one expect?
The title of this hearing is not a question—it is a fact.
The playroom and the nursery are unsafe. With the abil-
ity to calculate with some level of precision what re-
mains of downstream liability and breed that small in-
cremental cost into the price of the products they sell,
again, what else would you expect?
II. Select Casualties of Tort Reform Relevant
to Foreign Manufacturers
This is an opportune moment to reflect on that which
has been done to our civil justice system. Putting aside
arbitrary caps on both punitive damages and non-
economic loss, and perhaps a dozen other pernicious
items on the tort reform agenda, I will address briefly
five ‘‘reforms:’’ abolition of joint and several liability,
elimination of strict liability in tort,2 adoption of stat-
utes of repose, limitation on the liability of retail sellers,
and the current appalling state of the Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Commission.
A. Joint and Several Liability
Had many of the states not abolished joint and sev-
eral liability, a prize of tort reformers, the question of
accountability for foreign manufacturers would be of
far less consequence. In those states that retain joint
and several liability, retailers, distributors, or wholesal-
1 This is not an academic ‘‘I told you so moment. . .’’ but,
frankly, Congress was told that something like this would hap-
pen. With great eloquence, Professors Michael Rustad, Mar-
shall Shapo, Frank Vandal, Joseph Page, Teresa Schwartz,
Jerry Phillips, and many more testified, year in and year out,
that these so-called reform measures would undermine the in-
centive value of the tort system. With equal eloquence, the
same message was delivered by scores of lawyers who work in
product safety and related fields.
2 Strict liability for product liability refers to a cause of ac-
tion in tort where the defendant can be found liable if the
plaintiff can prove that the product the defendant sold is in a
defective condition, unreasonably dangerous to user or con-
sumer. Showing ‘‘defect’’ and ‘‘unreasonable danger’’ can be
demanding for plaintiffs. Liability is considered ‘‘strict’’ be-
cause once a product is shown to be in a ‘‘defective condition,
unreasonably dangerous to user or consumer,’’ the plaintiff
does not have to undertake the burdensome task of proving
classical negligence, although causation and damages must be
established. Restatement (Second) Section 402A.
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ers who place a product into the stream of commerce
bear full responsibility for harms that are the conse-
quence of a manufacturer’s (domestic or foreign) fail-
ure to exercise due care or a manufacturer’s decision to
produce a product in a defective condition, unreason-
ably dangerous to user or consumer. In the absence of
joint and several liability, the retailers and distributors
bear the responsibility only for the harm they cause,
and only to the percent that they cause it. They are not
responsible for the harm attributable to the manufac-
turer.
B. Strict Liability
The attack on strict liability, similarly, has made the
challenge of those injured by products significantly
more difficult. Not only have many states abolished
strict liability in tort by legislative action, but the vener-
ated American Law Institute made the horrendous de-
termination not to replicate Section 402A in the Re-
statement (Third) of Torts, instead adopting a system
that required a plaintiff to show a ‘‘reasonable alterna-
tive design.’’ Consider the difficulties of individual
plaintiffs establishing, from an engineering and scien-
tific standpoint, the criteria for an alternative design in
any case involving complex technology.
Strict liability allowed plaintiffs to recover when
harmed by a product if they can demonstrate the prod-
uct is in a defective condition, unreasonably dangerous
to the user; and permitted liability notwithstanding the
manufacturer or retailer’s assertions of due care.
There was little question why strict liability was
adopted. When products are sold en masse, with little
or no opportunity for inspection by the consumer, when
most product information is delivered to consumers in
30-second soundbites—and the whole of our retail
economy depends on consumers believing this
information—we had resolved the vulnerability of the
purchaser by allowing recovery when products fail. Un-
der strict liability we do not require consumers also to
master the technology of a manufacturer so that they
can show where the specific acts of negligence occurred
and how they, the injured consumer, could have figured
out a way to make the product safer.
C. Statutes of Repose
Tort reformers have sought also to impose statutes of
repose in most states and, only months ago, in Con-
gress. Rather than using the date on which a consumer
reasonably discovered he or she has been poisoned by
a manufacturer’s product to activate a statute of limita-
tions, a statute of repose sets an arbitrary limit based on
the day the product was placed into the stream of com-
merce. If one learns that one has been poisoned by a
product years after the product’s use (sadly, a common
phenomenon for many cancer-causing agents) but after
the period of repose has run, one is barred from bring-
ing a claim regardless of the clear fault of the producers
and sellers of the product. That, apparently, is part of
the ‘‘predicate of fairness’’ to which tort reformers of-
ten refer.
D. Retailer Liability
Among the many casualties of tort reform, however,
one of the most egregious is the quest to remove ac-
countability of retailers who sell defective goods. Liabil-
ity was imposed on retailers, initially, because they
place goods into the stream of commerce and profit
from the sale of those goods. Retailers were held liable
for good reason: Retailers have the most direct oppor-
tunity to communicate with consumers, highlighting
warnings or problems with the product, the last and
best opportunity to test a product if it appears to be
problematic, and every incentive in the world to make
sure the goods they sell are safe and effective. Perhaps
more importantly, large retailers have an enormous im-
pact on the design and quality of goods.
No individual consumer or consumer organization
carries the power of retailers in the United States when
it comes to the quality of consumer goods. If a large re-
tail chain decides that a product it is selling can be the
basis for civil liability, it will cease to sell that product.
Further, unless they suffer from some form of corporate
masochism, they will communicate with the manufac-
turer and exact pressure on the manufacturer or de-
signer to improve the quality and integrity of that prod-
uct, assuming that it was otherwise a commercially suc-
cessful item. The fact is, without retailers,
manufacturers and fabricators vanish. They are vital to
the stream of commerce.
Retailers are also an enormously powerful political
constituency. Over the last quarter century, they have
managed to convince a number of state legislatures,
and a number of congressional committees, that they
are an endangered species and entitled to special pro-
tection under our tort system. Bill after bill has pro-
posed eliminating strict liability for retailers and, at the
state level, many of them have been successful.
The problem with foreign manufacturers and the lack
of easy accountability can be seen, at least in a limited
context, as a problem of retailers. Take for example
France v. Harley Davidson.3 That case holds, among
other things, that under the applicable Utah common
law, a defendant cannot be liable for any amount in ex-
cess of the proportional fault attributed to that defen-
dant. That means no joint and several liability. It also
means that if the retailer did not participate in the de-
sign of a product it sells, there will be a great battle at
trial to show that the retailer bears any accountability
whatsoever. Moreover, of particular importance given
the problem under consideration regarding non-U.S.
manufacturers, Utah law states that ‘‘when a party is
determined to be a passive retailer, there is no strict li-
ability for design or manufacturing defects.’’4
A passive retailer is an entity that does not participate
directly in packaging, labeling, or design of a particular
product. Without cataloging the various catastrophic
product failures that served as the incentive to conduct
this hearing, suffice it to say that a number of domestic
retailers involved in the sale of foreign goods will lay
claim to the label ‘‘passive retailer.’’ By virtue of tort re-
form, they will not be liable.5
Given the difficulty of suing successfully foreign
manufacturers and putting aside the matter of jurisdic-
3 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 44213 (D. Utah, June 18, 2007).
4 Sanns v. Butterfield Ford, 94 P.3d 301 (Utah App. 2004).
5 One is hard pressed to understand the obsession of tort re-
formers to protect retailers. Frankly, they already had fairly
comprehensive cover by virtue of indemnification agreements
common in the sale of goods in the U.S. The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, at 886 b, comment h, suggested that a supplier
of a defective good ought to indemnify retailers assuming the
retailer was not engaged in the direct design, development, or
labeling of the particular product in question.
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tion and the difficulty of enforcing judgments (dis-
cussed infra), retailers may be all that plaintiffs have
left, and retailers as a source for accountability under
the currently destabilized, tort-reformed system, are
likely to prove a very unsatisfying target for profoundly
injured plaintiffs.
E. Marginalization of the Consumer Product
Safety Commission
Finally, there is a significant public expectation that
when products fail in the United States, a regulatory
and civil justice system is in place to hold accountable
those responsible for that failure. As discussed, the tort
system has taken a number of direct hits, giving rise to
the question whether the Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC) can be a powerful agent for ac-
countability and protection of innocent at-risk consum-
ers. After all, one argument made by tort reformers is
that it is just unfair to be subject to liability in Article III
courts and also subject to the aggressive, intrusive regu-
latory initiatives of the CPSC. It is a completely farcical
argument.
The CPSC, an agency with enormous potential both
to inform consumers of product risks as well as to abate
those risks, has not exactly distinguished itself when it
comes to being out front, protecting the interests of
consumers who rely on it to check the safety of the
products they use. There are good reasons for this in-
sufficiency, beginning with the fact that the entire bud-
get for the Consumer Product Safety Commission is $62
million, a sum one-tenth the annual advertising budget
of Wal-Mart. If Congress intended the CPSC to protect
the American public against unsafe products, to com-
municate with the public regarding a broad range of
product risks, to define and analyze substantial product
hazards, to test independently products and make rec-
ommendations regarding their safety and efficacy, one
would think that Congress would want to spend more
than is spent on advertising in approximately one
month by Wal-Mart.6
It is not that the statutory structure of the CPSC is in-
herently problematic. The CPSC has the power to ban
products that constitute substantial product hazards. It
has extensive communication capacity, were it to exer-
cise that ability. Further, unlike courts, the statutes per-
taining to the CPSC allow for accountability of manu-
facturers, wholesalers, retailers, and distributors. Were
the agency functional, this force might be of conse-
quence. Unfortunately, while the agency is many
things, fully functional it is not. To be clear, it is not that
the CPSC has failed to attract some of the finest person-
nel in government. There are terrific scientists, lawyers,
and policy analysts at the CPSC. With a shoe-string
budget and related political problems, even those of
great talent and capacity will not be able to achieve the
clear legislative mandate of the agency.
With the CPSC playing catch-up and doing so poorly,
it will fall on the post-tort reformed system of civil jus-
tice to impose responsibility. Assuming that tort reform
has not destroyed entirely the ability of injured consum-
ers to seek justice in our courts, the first question to ad-
dress is whether a U.S. court will ever see one of these
foreign manufacturers. It is not easy to sue a foreign
manufacturer, nor is it easy to collect a judgment, as-
suming one has been secured, as the following sections
of this statement suggest.
III. Jurisdictional Issues Relevant to Holding
Non-U.S. Manufacturers Civilly Liable in Tort
Non-U.S. manufacturers are subject to the jurisdic-
tion of domestic courts only when the plaintiff has es-
tablished that there are minimum contacts between the
non-U.S. entity and the forum state. Further, a court
must determine that the assertion of jurisdiction is con-
sistent with our notions of fair play, substantial justice,
fundamental fairness, and reasonability.7 For this as-
sessment, courts take into account the burden on the
defendant, the interests of the forum state, the plain-
tiff’s interest in obtaining relief, the efficient resolution
of the controversy, and the interests of the various
states in securing fundamental state policies.8
The more substantial the activity of the defendant,
the more directed or purposeful the activity of the de-
fendant is vis-a-vis the state, the more the defendant’s
activity suggests that it is ‘‘purposefully availing’’ itself
of the rights and obligations the forum state provides,9
the more likely that the manufacturer will become a
party to a civil product liability claim. Of course, if the
foreign defendant is doing business in the state, i.e., is
physically present, there is not much of an issue.10
However, there is a real and important difference be-
tween the physical presence of the defendant’s business
enterprise and the simple foreseeable presence of a
product the defendant sells in the state.11
At the heart of the challenge to understand whether a
court will find personal jurisdiction over a foreign de-
fendant is Asahi Metal Industry v. Superior Court of
California.12 While there was no majority opinion in
Asahi, two schools of thought emerged. In Justice
O’Connor’s plurality opinion, the ‘‘minimum contacts’’
required to confer jurisdiction13 must come from ac-
tions that are directed purposely to a state and go be-
yond the coincidental placement of a product into the
stream of commerce of that state. Under this formula-
tion,14 if the product was designed specifically for a par-
6 I will leave to others a comprehensive critique of the
CPSC. It is noteworthy that the information regarding the im-
portation of defective goods from China came as a conse-
quence of data generated by a European entity, not the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission. Barboza, Mattel Recalls 19
Million Toys Sent From China, THE NEW YORK TIMES, August 15,
2007, p. 1.
7 Minimum contacts assessments are bounded by ‘‘fair play
and substantial justice.’’ International Shoe v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
8 Before ever getting to the substance of a claim, the matter
of venue, in personam jurisdiction, and subject matter jurisdic-
tion must be resolved favorably. In a nutshell, this requires
plaintiff to show that the venue (forum) is proper, that the
court has legal authority and power over the parties before it,
and that the case it is about to hear is within the range of dis-
putes for which the court is juridically competent.
9 Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
10 Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604
(1990).
11 World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980).
12 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
13 International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
14 The O’Connor articulation of ‘‘minimum contacts plus’’ is
devastating if the goal is to hold accountable non-U.S. manu-
facturers when their products are imported by large U.S. dis-
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ticular demand in the forum state, advertised in the fo-
rum state, or if the manufacturer established channels
for providing regular advice to customers, or marketed
or distributed it by a sales agreement that made clear
that the product would be sold in the forum state, the
contacts would be sufficient to establish in personam
jurisdiction.
The competing perspective comes from a separate
opinion in Asahi by Justice Brennan. In his view, the
minimum contacts requirements could be satisfied by
demonstrating that a foreign manufacturer produced its
goods with knowledge that they will be sold in the
United States and knowingly placed them into the
stream of commerce. In so doing, the manufacturer
avails itself of the protections, rights, and obligations of
the laws of the forum state.
Under both the plurality and concurring opinion in
Asahi, in personam jurisdiction requires an assessment
beyond the mere or coincidental presence of the defen-
dant’s product in the stream of commerce, in part be-
cause of the ‘‘unique burdens placed on one who must
defend oneself in a foreign legal system . . . .’’15
Whether a court follows Justice O’Connor’s plurality
opinion or Justice Brennan’s concurrence, a ‘‘business
may not shield itself from suit by a careful but formalis-
tic structuring of its business dealings.’’16 The more a
company engages in training, control of distribution
networks, development of instructional material de-
signed for U.S. markets, the more likely it is that a court
will find its contacts are sufficient regardless of whether
it follows the O’Connor or Brennan approach.17
In Vermeulen v. Renault,18 the court found that ‘‘the
current state of the law regarding personal jurisdiction
is unsettled.’’ The Vermeulen court divided Asahi opin-
ions into a simple stream of commerce analysis (Bren-
nan) and a ‘‘stream of commerce plus’’ analysis
(O’Connor). The court noted that a number of circuits
have simply forged their own path in trying to establish
standards for in personam jurisdiction, looking at mini-
mum contacts and then reasonable fairness, assuming
the minimum contacts have been met.19 In trying to de-
fine minimum contacts, the court paid particular atten-
tion to whether a foreign producer conducts regular
meetings in the United States designed to promote wide
distribution of their products.20 This does not bode well
for nearly anonymous foreign manufacturers of toys
who appear never to have set foot in the United
States.21
The Vermeulen court found that state courts ought to
take into account that an individual citizen injured by
an arguably defective product will have a far more dif-
ficult time moving to a different forum than would a
well-financed transnational corporation.22 In such
cases, the interest of individual state courts in providing
a forum is compelling. Further, witnesses and evidence
regarding the harm, including medical testimony, might
be extraordinarily difficult to assemble in a forum out-
side the United States, assuming a U.S. court chooses to
declare itself a forum non conveniens.23
While a number of courts have elected to follow Jus-
tice Brennan’s concurrence in Asahi, the majority fol-
low Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion, resulting in a
far more difficult jurisdictional challenge for injured
plaintiffs. What follows is a representative sample of re-
cent cases in which a court faced the Asahi problem:
whether to permit a case to go forward involving a for-
eign defendant who has allegedly harmed a domestic
plaintiff.
A. Recent Cases Where In Personam
Jurisdiction Failed.
While U.S. courts are sometimes amenable to assert-
ing jurisdiction over non-U.S. manufacturers who pro-
duce defective products,24 there are a number of recent
cases where plaintiffs have had difficulty meeting the
tributors, and then labeled, packaged, and sold the U.S. by a
company that handles all of the advertising and marketing.
15 Asahi at 114.
16 Benitez-Allende v. Alcan Alumino do Brazil, 857 F.2d 26,
30 (1st Cir. 1988).
17 It should be noted that not all courts follow Justice
O’Connor’s plurality opinion. Some follow Justice Brennan’s
concurrence which permits personal jurisdiction using a more
simplified ‘‘stream of commerce’’ test. The Supreme Court has
not resolved this difference of opinion. Asahi can be read as a
direct invitation to Congress to settle this matter.
18 985 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1993).
19 See Irving v. Owens Corning, 864 F.2d 383 (5th Cir.
1989); Demoss v. City Market, 762 Fed. Supp. 913 (D. Utah,
1991); Abuan v. General Electric, 735 Fed. Supp. 1479 (D.
Guam, 1990); Curtis Management Group v. Academy of Mo-
tion Picture Artists, 717 F. Supp. 1362 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
20 In re Perrier Bottled Water Litigation, 454 F. Supp. 264,
268 (D. Conn. 1990).
21 It bears mention that Vermeulen involved a defendant
who asserted that not only were there insufficient contacts but
that it was acting on behalf of a nation state and therefore was
protected under the Foreign Sovereignty Immunities Act. 28
U.S.C. at 1602 et. seq. While this contention is worthy of study,
the fact remains that Foreign Sovereignty Immunity Act pro-
tection rarely applies when the sovereign is acting as an agent
for a commercial provider of goods that are sold into the
stream of private commerce in the United States. If the action
of the sovereign does not involve the implementation of a law
or policy, or is not of consequence in terms of the various dip-
lomatic initiatives a state pursues, the Foreign Sovereignty Im-
munity defense will often fail.
22 It is assumed that every state has strong interest in pro-
viding effective means of redress for its residents and allowing
its residents to litigate those interests in their home state. Mc-
Gee v. International Life, 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
23 In March, 2007 the Supreme Court decided Sinochem In-
ternational v. Malaysia International Shipping, 127 S. Ct.
1184, 1190 (2007), which permits courts to make forum non
conveniens judgments before hearing personal subject matter
jurisdiction determinations. Sinochem held that a non-U.S. de-
fendant ‘‘bears a heavy burden in opposing the plaintiff’s cho-
sen forum.’’ The truth of the matter is that if a court grants a
request to dismiss cases on a forum non conveniens basis, the
likely outcome is that the U.S. plaintiff will fail to find a court
outside of the United States to hear their claim. Gonzalez v.
Chrysler, 301 F.3d 377, 383, note 9 (5th Cir. 2002), citing Rob-
inson, ‘‘Forum non Conveniens in America and England: A
Rather Fantastic Fiction,’’ 103 L. Q. Rev. 398, 418-419 (1987);
In re Crash off Long Island, New York, 65 F. Supp. 2d 207, 217
(S.D. N.Y. 1999). In contrast, where non-U.S. citizens are af-
fected by the activities of U.S. companies that occur outside of
the United States courts have not been receptive. In re Union
Carbide Corporation Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, 809 F.2d
195 (2nd Cir. 1987).
24 In Asahi the Court held that it would only be in ‘‘rare
cases in which the minimum requirements inherent in the con-
cept of fair play and substantial justice’’ defeat the jurisdiction
of a foreign court. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116.
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minimum contacts requirements. For example, in Ko-
zial v. Bombardier-Rotax,25 the court found that if the
sole contact a state has with a product (in this instance
an engine that was a component part) is that the part is
received in the state and immediately shipped to a dif-
ferent state, the mandates of personal jurisdiction and
fairness are not met.
In Cupp v. Alberto-Culver U.S.A.,26 the United States
District Court found a French cosmetics manufacturer
not subject to the personal jurisdiction of a federal court
in Tennessee. The court noted an absence of continuous
and systematic contacts in the United States, a lack of
offices or facilities, the absence of paid U.S. taxes, the
absence of board of directors meetings in the United
States, the absence of leased or owned property, a bank
account, or similar indicia of presence. While Cupp is
an antitrust case, the use of the jurisdictional factors
seems an appropriate analogy—and suggests that se-
curing jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers who
have not entered the United States will be a real ob-
stacle to imposing liability.
In Lesnick v. Lorillard,27 the court dealt with the
problem of assertion of jurisdiction over a U.S. out-of-
state corporation, somewhat distinguishing it from
those cases involving non-U.S. defendants. With that
qualification, it bears noting that Lesnick held that
there must be conduct beyond mere profit that justifies
the assertion of jurisdiction. In particular, Lesnick holds
that the conduct has to be ‘‘directed toward the state’’
in order for it to suffice for purposes of fundamental
fairness under the due process clause. In the case of
non-U.S. manufacturers, this case line may become a
stumbling block since large foreign producers who sell
in the United States may well not be targeting any one
particular state, other than by the activities of the do-
mestic retailer or wholesaler, and, like Lesnick, have
little contact with the United States other than profit.
Several other cases tell the same tale.
In Pierce v. Hayward,28 a plaintiff was seriously in-
jured when a pool filter ‘‘violently exploded in his face’’
while he was performing maintenance work. The manu-
facturer of the filter was located in Ontario, Canada.
The court found that there were insufficient contacts
with the forum state, Pennsylvania, despite the fact that
it seemed relatively foreseeable that the product in
question would be used in Pennsylvania. The court ex-
amined both the sales history and Internet documenta-
tion for the product and concluded that the exercise of
specific jurisdiction, under these circumstances, was in-
consistent with the mandate in Asahi, thus relieving the
defendant of any responsibility.
In Zombeck v. Amada,29 decided Nov. 15, 2007
(ironically, the date of the hearing convened to consider
this very question), plaintiff’s fingers were crushed and
ultimately required amputation after they were caught
in a hydraulic press brake manufactured by defendant
Amada Corp. Plaintiff brought suit against defendant, a
Japanese manufacturer. The suit was dismissed be-
cause the court found that the plaintiff did not show
that the defendant’s activity satisfied the ‘‘purposeful
availment’’ requirement derived from Justice
O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Asahi. The court noted
that the defendant did not ‘‘intentionally reach out’’ to
customers in Pennsylvania, did not ‘‘actively solicit’’
business in Pennsylvania, and that while defendant
maintained a Web site for users of its product that in-
cluded an interactive feature, this was little more than a
vehicle for ‘‘submission of comments.’’ Although plain-
tiff was able to show that Amada finances and leases its
products in Pennsylvania, it could not show what the
court characterized as ‘‘day-to-day’’ control by defen-
dant Amada.
In Affatato v. Hazet-Werk,30 plaintiff sustained a
head injury after a spring clamp he was attempting to
install ‘‘popped’’ and struck him. The manufacturer of
the spring clamp, Hazet-Werk, is a German corpora-
tion. Despite the fact that Hazet is a major supplier for
Mercedes-Benz vehicles sold in the United States, the
court found that it lacked jurisdiction. It noted that
there were no exclusive distributorships, and no pur-
poseful availment of Pennsylvania rights and entitle-
ments that would satisfy the minimum contact require-
ments. Hazet is a foreign-based entity, the court held,
with ‘‘no employees or assets in the forum and does not
market or sell any products in the forum.’’ The fact that
Hazet’s products are used extensively and foreseeably
was insufficient to convince the court to confer jurisdic-
tion.
In Envirotech Pumpsystems v. Sterling,31 the plaintiff
brought an infringement action against several foreign
corporations. The defendant, Willser, is a German cor-
poration. Plaintiff, Envirotech, argued that Willser’s
goods entered the United States ‘‘with the full knowl-
edge that those infringing goods would be entering the
stream of commerce . . . and could end up in the forum
state.’’ Envirotech claimed that Willser ‘‘knowingly di-
rected the importation’’ and that it was ‘‘reasonably
foreseeable that the infringing pumps might find their
way into Utah.’’ Rejecting the plaintiff’s argument, the
court found that since the defendants had not ‘‘made,
used, sold, or offered for sale . . .’’ the product in ques-
tion in Utah, the foreign manufacturer could not be sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the court. Its contacts were
found to be ‘‘not continuous and systematic’’ and, even
though there was ample communication provided
through a Web site, the contacts were deemed insuffi-
cient based on the court’s understanding of the plural-
ity opinion in Asahi.
Adherence to the Asahi plurality is also common at
the state level. For example, in Vargas v. Hong Jin,32
the plaintiff, a minor, sustained a severe head injury in
a motorcycle accident. Plaintiff alleged that the injuries
were exacerbated by the defective nature of the helmet
he was wearing produced by Hong Jin, a Korean manu-
facturer. The helmet in question was sold regularly
throughout the state. The court found, however, that be-
cause Hong Jin does not manufacture its products in
the state of Michigan, nor does it have an officer, agent
or representative in the state, nor does it own or possess
property in the state, nor does it promote directly its
products in the state, the state has insufficient mini-
mum contacts to ensure a fair trial. All this makes sense
until one realizes that these helmets were manufactured
25 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 7205 (11th Cir. April 22, 2005).
26 308 F. Supp. 2d 873 (W.D. Tenn. 2004).
27 35 F.3d 39 (4th Cir. 1994).
28 U.S. Dist. Court, E.D. Pa, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81393.
29 U.S. Dist. Court, W.D. Pa., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84563.
30 U.S. Dist. Court, E.D. Pa., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21067.
31 Dist. Court, Utah, Central Division, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16942.
32 636 N.W.2d 291 (Mich. App. 2001).
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with the purpose of being sold in the United States and
that it was perfectly foreseeable that they would be sold
in Michigan. The store in which the helmets were sold,
Specter’s Cycles, sells Hong Jin helmets regularly and
is located in Owosso, Mich. The court focused on the
fact that the products were imported into the United
States to a distributor in Wisconsin, not Michigan, and
that they were disseminated from the distributor to
Michigan.
Finally, in Burnshire Development v. Cliffs Reduced
Iron,33 in personam jurisdiction was denied even
though the plaintiff could show that the defendant had
entered the forum state and set up a data room to house
corporate documents and set a date for a closing. These
activities were deemed insufficient to show purposeful
availment, leaving the plaintiff without recourse. In TH
Agriculture & Nutrition v. Ace European Group,34 a
non-U.S. defendant provided insurance coverage in the
forum state as part of ‘‘world wide coverage.’’ The court
decided the minimum contacts requirements were not
met since they were a Dutch company lacking offices,
employees, and an agent in the United States. In Jen-
nings v. AC Hydraulic A/S,35 the plaintiffs sought to as-
sert jurisdiction over a Danish manufacturer whose
product failed in the United States but lost because the
plaintiff could not meet the minimum contacts and rea-
sonability requirements established by the Supreme
Court.
The simple fact is that many U.S. courts find the re-
quirements in Asahi a blunt prohibition against the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers. The
plurality opinion commands a level of ‘‘purposeful
availment’’ of the specific rights and entitlements in the
forum state, a requirement that cannot be met in many
instances where the product is manufactured abroad
and then imported into the United States. As these
cases demonstrate, even when a foreign manufacturer’s
products foreseeably enter the stream of commerce in
the United States, generate a profit for the manufac-
turer, and proximately cause harm, the manufacturer
stands a very good chance of avoiding responsibility
when those products injure or kill U.S. consumers.
B. Recent Cases Where In Personam Jurisdiction
Was Found
The challenge in asserting jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation often boils down to the question whether
the defendant foreign corporation did anything more
than ‘‘set a product adrift in the international stream of
commerce.’’36 In Clune, the court relied on Barone v.
Rich Brothers Fireworks,37 which dealt with a manufac-
turer who had no office, no agent, no distributor, no ad-
vertising in the state, and did not send directly its prod-
ucts into the state, but was nonetheless subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction based on the fact that the
manufacturer had nine distributors in six states, one of
which was the forum state. When the manufacturer
claimed that it did not realize its products entered the
forum state, the court said ‘‘such ignorance defied rea-
son and could aptly be labeled as willful.’’38 The Barone
court found that when the manufacturer ‘‘reaps the
benefits of a distribution network’’ it cannot thereafter
deny the forum court’s jurisdiction. Other cases have
held that merely because a foreign manufacturer has
made use of a large scale marketing, several cases men-
tioning Wal-Mart and Target Corp., it is fair to conclude
that a manufacturer would derive substantial revenue
from their distribution supply chain and that could be a
sufficient ‘‘plus’’ for a stream of commerce argument.
In some cases, it is the sheer magnitude of the sales
of the product that seems to be convincing to a court.
For example, in Jones & Pointe v. Boto Co.,39 the fact
that the defendant, a non-U.S. manufacturer, sold $1.1
billion of artificial Christmas trees and derived a signifi-
cant revenue stream therefrom, seemed to convince the
court that it would be reasonable and fair to defend the
product liability claim in the United States and specifi-
cally in the Commonwealth of Virginia. The Boto court
paid particular attention to the presence of an Internet
Web site that describes the products that Boto manufac-
tures and allows consumers to retrieve information
about the products they have purchased. The court
found that because residents of the state of Virginia
could access the Web site and secure further informa-
tion pertinent to their needs, the requirement for mini-
mum contact was established.
The Boto court also held that ‘‘in this age of [the
North American Free Trade Agreement] and [the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] one can expect
further globalization of commerce, and it is only rea-
sonable for companies that distribute allegedly defec-
tive products through regional distributors in this coun-
try to anticipate being haled into court by plaintiffs in
their home states.’’40
In Bou-matic v. Ollimac Dairy,41 a plaintiff sought ju-
risdiction over the manufacturer of a robotic milking
system produced in the United Kingdom and The Neth-
erlands. The defendant argued that assertion of juris-
diction would conflict with national sovereignty since
the defendants were Dutch and British entities. The de-
fendants argued that the Asahi plurality prohibited the
assertion of jurisdiction if a plaintiff was able to show
only that it was merely foreseeable that the defendant’s
product would find its way into the foreign state’s
stream of commerce, and further that jurisdiction
would not be supported merely by showing that the de-
fendant had a level of reasonable awareness that the
products would be sold in the foreign state.
The Bou-matic court found first that the defendant
had an agent in the state in which jurisdiction was
sought and had designed the product for sale in that
state, meeting the ‘‘purposeful availment’’ test. Where
the defendant is knowingly present and the contacts are
more than random or fortuitous, the question becomes
one of reasonability,42 i.e., would the assertion of juris-
33 2006 LEXIS U.S. App. 21889 (6th Cir. August 23, 2006).
34 488 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2007).
35 383 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2004).
36 Clune v. Alimac Elevator 233 F.3d 538 (8th Cir. 2000).
37 25 F.3d 610 (8th Cir. 1994).
38 25 F.3d at 613.
39 498 F Supp. 2d 822 (E.D. Va., 2007).
40 Citing Barone v. Rich Brothers Fireworks, 25 F.3d 610,
615 (8th Cir. 1994).
41 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14543 (D. Cal., March 15, 2006).
42 Judging reasonability, the court relies on seven factors:
1) The extent of purposeful interjection; 2) The burden on the
defendant to defend the suit in the chosen forum; 3) The ex-
tent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s state; 4)
The foreign state’s interest in the dispute; 5) The most efficient
forum for judicial resolution of the dispute; 6) The importance
of the chosen forum to the plaintiff’s interest in convenient and
effective relief; 7) The existence of an alternative forum.
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diction offend notions of due process. The court also
noted that one must look broadly to the connections the
manufacturer has with the United States, not just to the
forum state, and that where a distributor has extensive
and continuing contacts with the U.S. market, a foreign
defendant should expect to be brought into U.S.
courts.43
In Eli Lilly v. Sicor Pharmaceutical,44 the court ana-
lyzed the extent to which having regular and consistent
contacts with customers as well as advertising in na-
tional trade journals would provide a sufficient basis for
personal jurisdiction. The defendant argued that since it
sold through an independent, out-of-state wholesaler
rather than engaging in direct sales, it was not subject-
ing itself to the jurisdiction of the Indiana courts. The
court disagreed, finding that the presence of a ‘‘middle-
man’’ does not insulate a company, and in fact shows
that a company has ‘‘purposefully availed itself of the
forum state by generating . . . commercial activity
within the state.’’
In addition to foreseeable presence or knowledge of
probable sales, courts have used factors such as sharing
a trademark with the distributing company in the state
in question and jointly marketing a product in the
United States with a U.S. distributor.45 Non-U.S. manu-
facturers seem to have great affection for the argument
that selling through an independent distributor some-
how insulates them from the jurisdiction of the U.S.
courts. An examination of the case law suggests that
this is a less than fully reliable strategy if the goal is to
avoid being ‘‘haled’’ into U.S. courts.
A recent Ohio decision, State of Ohio ex rel Attorney
General Marc Dann v. Grand Tobacco,46 explored the
question of the extent to which using an independent
domestic distributor provides some insulation from the
jurisdictional reach of U.S. courts. Relying on Mott v.
Schelling,47 the Ohio court found that the use of an in-
dependent distributor is rarely the basis for limiting or
prohibiting the exercise of jurisdiction. The court found
that if a foreign manufacturer knows that its products
are being sold in the United States, cultivates its market
there by taking into account U.S. standards in design
and manufacture, and benefits from U.S. sales, a mere
‘‘paper transfer’’ to an independent distributor is an in-
sufficient basis to prevent the exercise of jurisdiction.
Along similar lines, an Illinois court held, in Saia v.
Scripto-Tokai,48 that it would be ‘‘fundamentally un-
fair’’ to allow a foreign manufacturer to insulate itself
from the jurisdiction of the court solely by the use of a
distributor. The Saia court found that the use of a sub-
sidiary to introduce a product into a state market may
alone be sufficient to exercise jurisdiction over a for-
eign corporation that negligently designs a product.
Saia is a case about a tragic death of a three-year-old
child caused by a fire started when a defectively de-
signed ‘‘Aim-N-Flame’’ lighter malfunctioned. Saia re-
lies on the ‘‘stream of commerce’’ argument associated
with the Brennan opinion in Asahi. All that is required,
the Saia court said, was whether the defendant had en-
gaged in some action or conduct that invoked the ben-
efits and protection of the law of the forum. The court
found that selling a product in a state gives the manu-
facturer certain benefits from the laws of the state and
that any inconvenience the defendant might suffer in
having to defend a case in the state is offset by the need
of protecting the citizens affected adversely by the
product.
The Saia case is of interest since the defendant in
question, Tokai, is a foreign component part manufac-
turer of the lighter in question. Both parts were shipped
from Japan to Mexico, where they were assembled and
then packaged and transferred to K-Mart and presum-
ably other distributors. While Tokai argued that it was
not benefitting directly from those sales, the court dis-
agreed, finding that it obtained profits from the manu-
facture and sale of its products in question, and saying
that was sufficient to support the assertion of jurisdic-
tion in the state.
In Ruiz de Moina v. Merritt and Ferman,49 the court
evaluated the factors from Asahi and then distilled
them down to the notion that so long as the non-U.S.
defendant has a ‘‘fair warning’’ that a particular activity
may subject it to the jurisdiction of the foreign sover-
eign, the exercise of that jurisdiction does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
* * *
The above brief review of jurisdictional challenges
does not lead to any obvious conclusion. One cannot
generalize that non-U.S. manufacturers will or will not
be subject to the jurisdiction of domestic courts. It de-
pends on whether the court in which the claim is filed
follows the O’Connor or Brennan position, the nature of
the relationship the manufacturer has with the domes-
tic retailer, and the broad range of factors discussed in
the cases above. In the end, the decision will be made
on a case-by-case basis.
Next, assuming there are minimum contacts subject-
ing the manufacturer to the jurisdiction of a U.S. court
and there are no successful challenges to jurisdiction
based on notions of reasonability or fundamental fair-
ness, the very real question arises regarding the likeli-
hood that evidence can be marshaled and that a judg-
ment, if rendered against the manufacturer, can be en-
forced.
IV. Practical Problems Dealing With Non-U.S.
Defendants
The problem of holding foreign manufacturers ac-
countable, once jurisdiction and venue are decided, is
by no means a simple task.
43 In many cases, including Bou-matic, foreign defendants
will argue that their presence in U.S. courts is somehow con-
nected with the interests of their sovereign country. The Bou-
matic court, as most courts, looked carefully at this claim and,
as is often the case, if the defendants can identify no foreign
policy, law or political consideration that would be affected by
the assertion of jurisdiction, then the defendants cannot lay
claim to the defense that they are acting on behalf of a foreign
sovereign, and likewise cannot lay claim to any protections un-
der the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
44 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 31657 (D. Ind., April 27, 2007).
45 AV Imports v. Colde Fratta, 171 F. Supp. 2d 369 (D.C.
N.J. 2001).
46 871 N.E. 2d 1255 (Ohio App. 2007).
47 1992 U.S. Lexis 13273 (6th Cir. 1992).
48 366 Ill. App. 3rd 419, 2006 Ill. App. Lexis 423 (May 26,
2006). 49 207 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 2000).
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A. Discovery
First, while U.S. courts are a convenient forum for
victims residing in the United States, the case against
the defendant must be imported. Design processes, test-
ing data, information regarding product malfunction,
company witnesses, and similar data required to de-
velop the cause of action are likely to be outside of the
United States and difficult to pin down.
It would be naive to assume that the discovery pro-
cess used in the United States to secure such informa-
tion in advance of a trial is readily available when the
named defendant is a foreign entity. Countries outside
of the United States have not been particularly recep-
tive to discovery orders issued by U.S. courts. Prelimi-
narily, most foreign courts will reject any request for in-
formation if it is needed to establish in personam juris-
diction, limiting consideration solely to cases where
there is in personam jurisdiction and minimum contacts
have been satisfied by evidence and information avail-
able in the United States. For every plaintiff, the task
will be to secure information first to establish the pres-
ence of jurisdiction—and in that instance, they will of-
ten find foreign courts unhelpful.
B. Blocking Statutes
The difficulties in securing cooperation with foreign
countries is compounded by the presence of ‘‘blocking
statutes’’ that explicitly prohibit foreign courts from
implementing U.S. discovery orders for a variety of rea-
sons, some of which have to do with reciprocity, i.e., the
willingness of U.S. courts to implement non-U.S. dis-
covery requests for foreign proceedings.
Efforts have been made to facilitate the exchange of
documents for precisely this kind of situation. The
Hague Convention on Service of Process Abroad for ju-
dicial and extra-territorial documents is designed to
provide a predictable methodology for service of pro-
cess abroad. The process is time-consuming and re-
quires the participation of the Office of the United
States Marshal as well as translation of all discovery re-
quests into the language of the country from which
documents are solicited. The methodologies established
by the Hague Convention have not been uniformly suc-
cessful, prompting the Supreme Court to hold that The
Hague Convention ‘‘is not the exclusive means for ob-
taining discovery from a foreign entity.’’50
C. Enforcement of Judgments
Another practical problem is the difficulty of enforc-
ing judgments on parties outside the United States. To
put it mildly, the United States has not been in a posi-
tion where it can lay claim to broad and expansive co-
mity. At the present time, there do not appear to be any
treaties or agreements that readily allow for the en-
forcement of a U.S. judgment outside of the United
States.51
D. Two Simple Suggestions to Deal With Non-U.S.
Manufacturers
1. Bond Requirement
First, consideration should be given to requiring non-
U.S. producers of consumer goods sold in the United
States to post a bond in the event those goods prove de-
fective and dangerous. The bond requirement could be-
come a condition of doing business in the United States
and presumably part of the body of laws and regula-
tions pertaining to customs and trade. Should a foreign
manufacturer fail to secure a bond, presumably the dis-
tributing wholesaler or retailer would bear responsibil-
ity for securing that protection.
2. Consent or Party Autonomy
A second approach would be to require that any non-
U.S. manufacturer consent to the jurisdiction of the
state courts in which their products are distributed as a
condition of importing their goods into the United
States. Our legal system has long regarded party au-
tonomy in choice of law (conflict of laws) cases. Con-
sent to jurisdiction, much like agreements regarding the
body of laws to apply in a particular transaction, is com-
mon, understandable and effective.52
Requiring foreign manufacturers to post a bond or
creating ‘‘consent to jurisdiction requirements’’ as a
condition of importing goods into the United States
have appeal because of their simplicity but need to be
assessed carefully. For example, a bonding requirement
could be seen (wrongly) as a de jure cap on liability, a
tragic consequence that should be avoided.
There may be some who argue that the free trade
goal in NAFTA and similar agreements suggests cau-
tion in imposing any additional obstacles to the impor-
tation of goods into the United States. Were the imposi-
tion of responsibility unreasonable or unduly onerous,
they would probably have a good point. Here, the impo-
sition of responsibility is neither unreasonable nor
onerous. In fact, it is the same obligation that must be
met by all U.S. manufacturers.
V. Post-Hearing Addendum
After the hearing on Nov. 15, 2007, The Honorable
Linda Sánchez, chair, United States Committee on the
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Commercial and Adminis-
trative Law, began the process of drafting legislation to
address many of the issues mentioned in the above tes-
timony. As of the date of this publication, that legisla-
tion is being circulated for comments. The current pro-
posal would amend Title 28 and confer jurisdiction over
foreign manufacturers of defective products in U.S. Dis-
trict Courts anytime those products are reasonably and
foreseeably sold in the state in which the federal court
is located.
In another initiative, Rep. Peter Visclosky (D-Ind.),
Chairman of the House Appropriations Energy and Wa-
50 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United
States District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 539 (1987).
51 Enforcement of Judgments, U.S. State Department,
HTTP: //travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/judicial_691.html
(site last accessed November 15, 2007).
52 In the automobile safety area, the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. 30164, requires non-U.S.
manufacturers selling vehicles in the United States to desig-
nate a permanent resident of the U.S. as an agent for service
of process and for purposes of administrative and judicial pro-
ceedings that might result if the product turns out to be prob-
lematic. A clarification of those rules issued in August 2005
(Fed. Reg. August 8, 2005, vol. 70, no. 151).
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ter Development Subcommittee, announced that he was
supporting The Food and Product Safety Act, a bill de-
signed to require importers of goods to secure bonding
prior to introducing their products into the United
States. The idea is to ensure that ‘‘importers have
enough money or insurance to pay for damages their
products might cause, and [to compel] . . . importers to
take extra effort to ensure the quality of the goods they
bring into this country.’’53
An expansive companion bill sponsored by Sen.
Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio) and Robert Casey (D-Pa.)
would require U.S. Customs and Border Protection to
monitor all imports and to set up a system that allows
an assessment of insurance or other assets to guarantee
coverage in the event a product manufactured abroad
and sold in the United States causes injury as a result of
a design or manufacturing defect. That same legislation
would give the Secretary of Agriculture and the Food
and Drug Administration recall authority over defective
food or drugs, and would give Homeland Security re-
sponsibility to oversee and evaluate these measures.54
Finally, Congress was presented with the Consumer
Product Safety Modernization Act,55 which has the
stated purpose of providing the CPSC with adequate
funding.
As this legislation works its way through the process
in Washington, the Chinese government claims it is tak-
ing action to address the situation. The government
promises to promulgate ‘‘10,000 national quality stan-
dards,’’ for consumer goods, including food. The Chi-
nese regulatory model is supposed to result in 31,000
product standards, though the enforcement mechanism
for export control is, at this point, unclear.56
In addition to federal and extra-jurisdictional mea-
sures, several states have drafted legislation to deal
with the importation of defective goods. In Michigan,
Governor Granholm supported a bill proposed by State
Representative Andrew Coulouris and State Senator
Roger N. Kahn that bans the sale of children’s toys with
high levels of lead paint.57 This legislation establishes
fines for the sale of defective goods and does not re-
solve the jurisdictional issues that plague the sale of de-
fective products manufactured by non-U.S. companies.
Legislators in Connecticut recently proposed the
Children’s Product Safety Act that would ban the sale of
recalled goods. Connecticut became the ninth state in
the country to ban the sale of recalled products.58
Thus far, while these initiatives seem unlikely to re-
solve in any meaningful manner the jurisdictional prob-
lems associated with the importation of defective prod-
ucts, the industry has responded with an aggressive
public relations effort.59 Moreover, while U.S. manufac-
turers were vocal at the hearing in urging Congress to
take steps to impose liability on foreign producers of
defective products, the relentless quest to relieve do-
mestic producers of liability both through the agencies
and the Congress continues unabated.60
In the last six months we have learned of virtually
millions of foreign manufactured goods sold in the
United States that are defective, dangerous, and deadly.
The testimony provided on Nov. 15, 2007, by all mem-
bers of the panel detailed exquisitely the range and na-
ture of the problem. If foreign manufacturers are out-
side the jurisdictional reach of the courts, injured con-
sumers could be left without recourse.61
Foreign manufacturers who sell goods that, foresee-
ably, will be purchased and used in the United States
ought to bear responsibility when those products fail,
much the same as U.S. manufacturers. Among other
things, it is simply unfair to U.S. manufacturers to bear
full responsibility for product failures when their for-
eign competitors can be relieved of liability solely based
on the fact that they are located outside the United
States.
In other areas of law, for example antitrust, the Con-
gress and the courts have had no difficulty with the no-
tion that non-U.S. entities that have a direct and real ef-
fect on U.S. commerce bear responsibility for those
consequences. The field of product liability should be
no different, both from the perspective of fairness to the
manufacturers and, more importantly, from the per-
spective of fairness to injured consumers.
There are obvious options. Congress could create a
bond requirement to insure that injured consumers will
have some recourse in the event a product made abroad
causes injury, and (a) the domestic retailer or distribu-
tor does not cover the loss; or, (b) the foreign manufac-
turer is unavailable for suit because of the restrictive
language in Asahi.
Further, as part of the U.S. Customs procedures,
Congress could require manufacturers of consumer
goods produced outside the United States to consent to
the jurisdiction of any domestic state court in which
their products are sold as a condition of importation.
Finally, Congress ought to clarify Title 28 and resolve
the problems surrounding the in personam jurisdiction
requirement by adopting the ‘‘aggregate of national
contacts’’ test. There is no constitutional mandate to
implement the definition of minimum contacts articu-
lated in Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Asahi.
To the contrary, the opinion avoids limiting the capac-
ity of Congress to take action to resolve this matter, not-
ing only that it is not deciding whether an ‘‘aggregate of
53 ‘‘Visclosky Bill Protects Consumers from Unsafe Prod-
ucts,’’ STATES NEWS SERVICE, January 17, 2008.
54 Id.
55 H.R. 4040, 110th Congress, 1st Session, 153 Cong Rec H
16874, December 19, 2007.
56 ‘‘More Legislation to Combat Shoddy Products,’’ FINAN-
CIAL TIMES, January 9, 2008.
57 Barrie Barber, ‘‘Kahn Targets Toxic Toys,’’ SAGINAW NEWS,
(December15, 2007).
58 Filvio Cativa, ‘‘Tracking recalls: Whose Job,’’ HARTFORD
COURANT, January 25, 2008, B9.
59 Donald Greenlees, ‘‘Toy Makers Mount Drive to Salvage
China’s Safety Reputation,’’ THE NEW YORK TIMES, C4, January
10, 2008
60 ‘‘Kennedy, Colleagues Question FDA Liability Shield
Proposal,’’ BNA, Inc. Product Safety & Liability Reporter, Ja-
nuray 28, 2008.
61 To be sure, state statutes and the common law of product
liability suggests that in the event a manufacturer is unavail-
able for service process or is bankrupt, the retailer or whole-
saler is obligated to take up the slack. As a practical matter,
unless those parties have prepared for this eventuality, i.e., se-
cured adequate insurance, this protection can be illusory.
Small retailers are, for the most part, in no position to cover
the costs of a major product failure. Thus the sole meaningful
recourse is the foreign manufacturer, recourse that is denied if
the plurality opinion in Asahi continues to be the dominant po-
sition in U.S. courts.
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national contacts’’ would suffice for minimum con-
tacts.62
Legislation that requires foreign manufacturers to
post a bond and consent to the jurisdiction of state
courts, and adopts the ‘‘aggregate of contacts tests’’
test, would go a long way to resolving the problems as-
sociated with the domestic sales of defective foreign
goods.
62 Asahi Metal Industry v. Superior Court of California, 480
U.S. 102, 105, fn 1(1987). ‘‘We have no occasion here to deter-
mine whether Congress could, consistent with the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court per-
sonal jurisdiction over alien defendants based on the aggre-
gate of national contacts, rather than on the contacts between
the defendant and the State in which the federal court sits.’’
[citations omitted]
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